THE ANNOTATED AMBEDKAR


Evidence Before the Southborough Committee, Part 4


This is a reproduction of the written evidence Ambedkar gave to the Franchise Committee (1918–19) headed by Francis Hopwood, Lord Southborough (from which, the popular name, Southborough Committee).

Pagination in square brackets corresponds to Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, vol. 1 (Bombay: Government of Maharashtra, 1979).

All notes are mine.


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21. If one agrees with the definition of slave as given by Plato, who defines him as one who accepts from another the purposes which control his conduct1John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 98., the untouchables are really slaves. The untouchables are so socialized as never to complain of their low estate. Still less do they ever dream of trying to improve their lot, by forcing the other classes to treat [256] them with that common respect which one man owes to another. The idea that they have been born to their lot is so ingrained in their mind that it never occurs to them to think that their fate is anything but irrevocable. Nothing will ever persuade them that men are all made of the same clay, or that they have the right to insist on better treatment than that meted out to them.

22. The exact description of the treatment cannot be attempted. The word untouchable is an epitome of their ills and sufferings. Not only has untouchability arrested the growth of their personality but also it comes in the way of their material well-being. It has also deprived them of certain civil rights. For instance, in Konkan the untouchables are prohibited from using the public road. If some high caste man happens to cross him, he has to be out of the way and stand at such a distance that his shadow will not fall on the high caste man.

The untouchable is not even a citizen. Citizenship is a bundle of rights such as (1) personal liberty, (2) personal security, (3) rights to hold private property, (4) equality before law, (5) liberty of conscience, (6) freedom of opinion and speech, (7) right of assembly, (8) right of representation in a country’s Government and (9) right to hold office under the State. The British Government by gradual growth may be said to have conceded these rights at least in theory to its Indian subjects. The right of representation and the right to hold office under the State are the two most important rights that make up citizenship.

But the untouchability of the untouchables puts these rights far beyond their reach. In a few places they do not even possess such insignificant rights as personal liberty and personal security, and equality before law is not always assured to them. These are the interests of the untouchables. And as can be easily seen they can be represented by the untouchables alone. They are distinctively their own interests and none else can truly voice them.

A free trade interest can be voiced by a Brahmin, a Mohammedan or a Maratha equally well. But none of these can speak for the interests of the untouchables because they are not untouchables. Untouchability constitutes a definite set of interests which the untouchables alone can speak for. Hence it is evident that we must find the untouchables to represent their grievances which are their interests and, secondly, we must find them in such numbers as will constitute a force sufficient to claim redress.

23. Now, will a general territorial electorate provided for the adequate return of the untouchables to the law-making body? Referring back to the figures we find that the untouchables (represented in the table by the Mahars), though they formed 69.4 in every thousand of the population, did not claim even a voter from their class. Under such circumstances it is impossible for them to elect their own man in a general electorate.

On the other hand they must despair of any votes being cast by the touchable Hindus for an untouchable candidate. The gradation of castes produces a certain [257] theological basis which cuts the untouchables both ways: in the minds of the lower orders it creates a preference for the higher orders while it creates a contempt for the lower orders in the minds of the higher orders. Thus the ascending scale of preference and the descending scale of hatred and contempt beggars the untouchables both ways. Without giving a single vote to the untouchables the touchables are sure to make a large draft on the already meagre voting strength of the untouchables.

24. So situated, the untouchables with the largest interests at stake will be the greatest sufferers in a general territorial electorate. To give them an opening, special provision shall have to be made for their adequate representation. But before a scheme can be outlined it is necessary to see how much is the untouchable population in the Bombay Presidency. The Census Report for the Bombay Presidency for the year 1911 gives the following figures for castes which ‘cause pollution’.

The following figures give the distribution of the untouchables by districts:

25. The total population of the Bombay Presidency by the Census of 1911 (British districts only) is 19,626,477. Of this the untouchable population is 1,627,980 or 8 per cent of the total. Assuming for the present the Bombay Legislative Council to consist of 100 elected members, the untouchables should have 8 representatives to represent them in the Council. If we distribute one representative to every 200,000 of the people (which is just the ratio of 100 representatives to the 20 millions of the population), then the untouchables can by right claim 8 representatives to themselves. But the untouchables of the Bombay Presidency may be allowed to elect 9 members in all. The election of one additional member will be justified later on.

26. Allowing them to elect 9 members, the constituencies which are to elect them should be as follows:

The various districts of the Presidency except the City of Bombay and the Province of Sind should be grouped together on a linguistic basis as follows: [259]

[260] 27. The following should be the constituencies of the untouchables and the number of representatives which each constituency should elect:

[261] These 9 elected members should form a constituency to elect one member from among themselves to represent the untouchables of this Presidency in the Imperial Legislative Council.

28. It may be objected that though 8 representatives are not in excess to the untouchable population it may be in excess to the voting strength of untouchables. That the untouchables are a poor community and that under the same franchise they yield per thousand a smaller proportion of voters than other communities is a fact. But if the grave position of the untouchables is admitted instead of restricting their number of representatives, the aim should be to increase the number of their voters, i.e., we must aim at lowering the franchise so far as the untouchables are concerned.

29. What the franchise should be is a very important question. There is a line of argument which urges that franchise should be given to those only who can be expected to make an intelligent use of it. As against this view it can be said in the words of Prof. L. T. Hobhouse that it is true that:

the success of democracy depends on the response of voters to the opportunities given them But conversely the opportunities must be given in order to call forth the response. The exercise of popular Government is itself an education … enfranchisement itself may precisely be the stimulus needed to awaken interest. …The ballot alone effectively liberates the quiet citizen from the tyranny of the shouter and the wire-puller. An impression of existing inertness alone is not a sufficient reason for with-holding responsible Government or restricting the area of suffrage.2L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism (London: Williams and Norgate, 1911), pp. 233–35.

Taking into consideration that suffrage is an education and that there are groups with unequal distribution of wealth and education among them and that these groups are not sympathetically like-minded, the authors of the reports rightly argue that the case for uniformity of franchise cannot be sustained.


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NOTES
  • 1
    John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 98. ↩︎
  • 2
    L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism (London: Williams and Norgate, 1911), pp. 233–35. ↩︎

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